>>Now we are going to talk about cars. I bought my first adult car. A Volkswagen. Turns out
German cars are a long troll just to take your money ‑‑ this had all of the fancy stuff. I
used to listen to big timers in college. They talked about frog eye headlights which my car has.
Then I hit a Coyote. There are like 40 headlights that go up and down. I had to keep taking
my car back and forth. My point is: In cars these days all kinds of shit can break and shit that
might be really problematic. That is what Charlie and Chris and going to talk about right
now. So, let's give these two a big Party Track welcome. (Applause) >> How's everyone
doing? Hangover's a gone? Still drunk? I think you all know Charlie. He is kind of Internet
famous. He works at Twitter. I am Chris Valasek. I work at IO hacker. We have been doing car
stuff a while. Nice enough to have us here last year as well. This year, Black Hat was
practice. Now the real thing. >> Now we have the kinks out. We can deliver the real deal. We
have introductory staff to go over. How car stuff works. Talk about cyber stuff. Then we will
cruise through remote survey. If you really want to read about that stuff you should check the
paper. It is already out. I will release it on the blog next week as well. 95 a pages of details
about all of the cars we looked at, our thoughts and conclusions. If you are really
interested, this is our song and dance ‑‑ read the paper. >> But he who is going to do that? >> I
wouldn't. I wrote it. >> Last year: Four downloads. >> The blog had like a zillion.
Reading's stupid. That is why I watch movies. (Multiple voices). >> Half a gig. That is why we
never release the slides: They are too hard to download. Lastly, we will talk about some
algorithms and a little device that Charlie and I came up with to stop the attacks that we have
known about so far. There is not going to be any remote cells. More of academic. Except we
actually release stuff. It's really motivated to talk about remote attacks and ‑‑ Frankly it
comes out to how we pick be our cars for research which was very scientific I would describe it.
>> How much money can we have. That is how we choose cars. >> Computer control. After last
year we wanted to do research and talk about remote things. (Off microphone). >> We were
like let's do research on which car to buy. >> That was probably a little misguided first time
around. Turns out I wases talking to academic guys they were like before we put a bought
our car we bought all these, manufacturers. Great idea. I wish we would have done that.
Which cars park them receives sweet. Can we afford that? Let's do it. (Off microphone) Talking
about which car we are going to buy. Hey, other people might be interested. Charlie had the
special treat for you at the end. Basically, the talk sucks. But if you stay to the last five
minutes I promise it's all good. Now a days, everyone seems interested. As soon as there is
a car wreck now the first question ends up being: Was the car hacked. We don't know. But
everyone seems really interested in this now. It is cool research to do. Popping shelves gets old
at some point. You want to pop something then smash it. That is why I think we have had a blast
doing this. Got a lot of good feedback and generally had a good time. Remember when you
crashed your car? >> Hacked. >> Definitely hacked. >> We wanted to get the facts out. If you are
interested in remote attacks and remott car research this is going to tell you exactly what
you need to do. So you don't have to his own to . . . It should ‑‑ everyone ‑‑ you should
be able to do that and wreck the car and see from some of the diagrams it is not really that
straightforward. >> Right. >> Some cars are one way, sop the other. Not that straightforward
some are less than others. Ours have computers. Charlie and I wanted to explain to you how
attacks work and we hired Pixar to do a little animation. This was the budget. They were all
hieroglyphic characters. They were the cheapest. Here is how the remote attack works: Shadowy
guy with computer, he does Internet to things or wireless to things. From there, the ‑‑
you could potentially have code running. That is what we are Kerned with. Not kind of
eavesdropping and his E. listening to things but want to execute code on a computer. That
may be on the same network or a different network which is represented by the chip thing
and that blue line. >> Step one ‑‑ there are 310 steps in remote attacks ‑‑ probably where
the. (Off microphone) At that point, you can't necessarily do harm to the car. You know ‑‑
maybe you could record their voice. We don't car about that. We want to crash. >> Smash them
up. After you figure out how to get on the computer can you send messages as well. While most
cars have steering angle sensors, a lot do not park themselves. That might mean you
don't control steering at all. You have to figure out what parts of the automobile were
controllable by computer messages. Were all of the parts of the car are computerized
doesn't mean the network messages will be able to control that all the time. >> That was
our research last year. Step one . . . step two can you send message from radio lands. Step
three can you make it do something. Our whole research was can you send messages. Can
you make it do something. >> Step four: Smash E. 'em up. That usually ends up being step four.
People have done this already. It is not theoretical to have wireless codec of a car,
physical aspects, take control. The researchers from the University of Washington and
University of California did this in ‑‑ 2011 (Car sounds) >> Beep‑beep‑beep. That was the
Internet. That looks dangerous. Here is a test track (Making car sounds) Look out. There is
something in the road. I hear something. They were able to get execution ‑‑ able to lock the
breaks and crash the car. >> We were plugged into the vehicle. We kind of did some different
things. We leveraged the actual normal cam [phonetic] messages. This is a video of crashing a
reporter from Fox news. If you have to crash a reporter, the Fox News guy. >> Smashed in an
'em bang. Off the road. As you saw him, he kind of took his hands off the wheel Charlie was
like don't do that. Then I pressed the button. Wrecked. It was all of. I was in the back ‑‑
you guys can make . . . yeah, we can. Okay. Show me. The camera man was faced backwards in the
camera seat. Went home to his wife and kids probably and gave them a big home. Did you guys
mean to do that? Yeah. Apologize? Shit. Earlier we were like put your seat belt on. He
was like I can't get the shot. Listen, not my fault. All this comes down to as Charlie said
before. We think remote hacking for control has at least three parts. Remote attacks. Everyone
is kind of familiar with that. Everyone is familiar with wireless communication. Look at
the cars, figure out which to buy and hack. We wanted to figure out which of the three
steps would be the easiest. We can't go out and buy 30 cars and bluetooth ‑‑ time, effort, money
we don't have all of it. What we did, instead of actually doing that we looked at the size
first. We were like the bigger, the more bugs, better chance of gaining remote access. Try code.
More code, more chance. That is the way we figure it. Do you have a different opinion? Then .
. . >> Get out! >> Come back for the last five minutes. >> Other part is cyber people: Take
messages that control physical aspects. Adaptive cruise control, car breaks if it sees a
car in front of it. City driving, things like that. These are ways that you almost can
guarantee that you can send a computer message. A lot of times people used diagnostic messages.
You may or may not be able to do something. With cyberphysical aspects, they are designed to ‑‑
>> We found, we did our research on the Escape and Priu tee. The Escape didn't have any ‑‑ we
were not able to make the breaks lock up and make them work which was exciting. On the Prius they
had a computer designed to send messages on the cam bus for the breaks. We had to do what they
do. It is a feature. When we were trying to figure out of 30 cars which we want to buy ‑‑
again we don't know whether the breaks have a vulnerability we want to engagement the most
features are probably having the most things you can control. We wanted success with this. Don't
want to look like bigger losers we already are. Remember the battery ‑‑ >> Talk about
failure. >>Literally did not watch it. It was too embarrassing. >> The third piece
is network. A lot of this is about. A lot of people, especially the media were very
keen on. Remember it is only one‑third of the whole equation we are talking about. Certain
cars have certain features at certain places. Not just this big platform. They can be
segregated. Certain cars may provide challenges others don't. With the second ‑‑ network. If
you attack, say, the radio and you want to control, say, the breaks, can you get messages
from one to the other. Can imagine a car designed that there is no physical way to get
messages from one to the other. In which case you are safe. You can attack my radio all you
want, can't crash me, I am happy with that. Other carses might have on the same ECU ‑‑ could.
Right next to each other in the network, nothing in the way to stop you from going from one to
the other. Searched all three of them, combined them, tried to figure out which cars we would
have the most success trying to do this on. As a prelude to next year's show. >> Exactly. >> We
have those cars. >> We got the cars we want. Now we have to ‑‑ >> Or never hear from us. Ride
off into the sunset and that will be that. >> Features for most people now are attack be
surface [phonetic] these cars are becoming more and more complex and connected. That is
why this work is even more intriguing. Super, super complicated computers on four
wheels that can brake themselves. Cars are complicated. It will be cool to
hack them. There are too many cars for any two, three, 40, 100 individuals to look at it.
Everyone needs to look at it as we look at code on the Internet. People look at cars and
information, how to do it. By now, I figure we have it covered. For some reason no one
did it. Probably because the tools are crap. But what are you going to do. Remote attack
service ‑‑ this was awesome. >> But dash there is a lot of remote attack servers we only
cover a few. I am taking my time. >> Go with that. >> So we are going to go in all different
kinds of things you can imagine is happening remotely, a vehicle. We are going to sort of
go in increasing range. The first one we have here is ‑‑ what is it called? Passes ‑‑
what is it called? >> It starts the car. >> On the left you see. (Off microphone). >> On the
right is a little thing that goes around dash. (Off microphone) There is a little
antenna in there. The data is passed between it to make sure only ‑‑ from an attack
perspective, I don't care about someone ‑‑ I care about can you have a little radio station
sending radio waves that somehow exploit a vulnerability in the code, waiting for this
information from the key? This one does not seem that lime the not much data a sent over radio.
It is a couple of millimeters. While it is an attack service, probably not the best. Giant ass
antenna pointing at ‑‑ I think it is obvious when you see a giant antenna pointing to the
passenger seat. I wasn't plugged in. That was remote. Right there. You could hack it. But
probably not your first choice. Next is the tire pressure monitoring. All of the cars
today since I don't know when ‑‑ >> 2006. >> Thank you, Mr. Egghead. Sensors in the tire
communicate wirelessly with an ten as that is processing that. Hey, light comes on, you are
getting a flat tire. In the floor here is ‑‑ function box. It has the antenna that receives
the signal from the sensors. Anyway the point is here you have maybe a little more range,
meters. There is going to be no complexity in the date that passed. All going to be like ‑‑
>> It is a number, right, the PSI of your tire. >> Not much more than that. >> But
researchers have communicated with cars. There is something going on! . Something. So, there
is code running. Means probably there is stuff there. Still we do not think it is the best
candidate for remote entry into a vehicle. But way better . . . almost everyone here is familiar
with the park clicker that can start ‑‑ sometimes start the opening in as well. These again,
broader range, talking more than a couple of meters now. Again, a con of it is probably the not
much data. Probably going to challenge the response, set a specific value to open or start
the car. Not really too much else. On the other hand it is usually connect the to a lot of
cool parts, locking, unlocking the door, the engine. Ends up in a cool place in the car.
Probably more concerned with theft from reproducing these than code execution as the car
flies by to do brakes or steering. Probably a more viable option. They are going to lock
down on these car manufacturers because they care about that. Hard reverse‑engineer. The
others we will get to in a second they probably don't care about. >> Exactly. One of the
more familiar wireless protocols is bluetooth. We think this is probably one of the most ripe
attack surfaces, right? Because almost every car has it because something for not using your
phone or demanding hands free. A lot of times they support streaming of audio and data. You
can stream your music. It also gets the ‑‑ I don't believe there is a lot of code out there
that has not had a vulnerability for audio parsing. For image parsing. These are things people
are familiar with. Especially because they have been around a while. They may be using old
computer software with known vulnerables. You have to get a new bluetooth. We think this is
one of the most viable attacks. (Off microphone) Still bluetooth, you have you to be
around 10‑meters, 30 minutes. You have to be able to see the car basically or be close
enough. There are some that you don't have to be very close at all. So, in your radio, you see
the beautiful radio from my cheap Ford Escape. It is obviously getting FM signal or
something with audio in it which probably I can't imagine but there is more data than that
coming 106.7. This is data that is sent anything to the actual you imagine people screwing
up ‑‑ people tend to mess it up. It is still pretty ‑‑ really, the holy grail a lot for all of
this is the gateway now for WiFi cars as well. The range is practically unlimited. If you
are in range, you are in range. They are designed to be used everywhere. You want to hit an
SOS button or get this connectivity. Or like Chris we want to make dinner
reservations. I have the car, SLS button. It has a concierge. Yo, I want dinner reservations.
Sir is this an emergency. Yes I want to make dinner reservations. Hit the other
button. This is for an emergency, people who are are dying. Can you still take dinner
reservations. Communicating data across the world. >> This is probably what most automobile
manufacturers worry about. The use is pretty well unstood. (Off microphone) Remotely as well.
The new thing I think that becomes very concerning for us is cars are now getting their
own apps, getting web browser, he we know we he can't write web browsers or secure apps. I hope
to have a car with a web browser. I don't know anything about that. So, a large part of
the security community is already familiar with this. That is why it ends up being pretty
concerning. Imagine you brought a device 2012 a piece of hardware that had web browser on
it, you couldn't update it. Would you be worried? If there is a problem it is really hear
to fix as well. Don't you dare ‑‑ >> I am not. I have this new Jeep that is cool. It can be
a WiFi hotspot. It provides Internet to ‑‑ but I actually, look here it has open services.
You can ‑‑ we are getting closer to cars being more like software which people like us ‑‑ most of
us understand, hardware problems. Bluetooth and radio stuff is still . . . in the
game. Getting in the car, services we have been doing years and years. >> Something
wrong, doesn't work. Came pre‑backdoor. >> Cyberphysical as I explained before they
control these last attributes. I am not the biggest fan of cyber anything. Well,. >> Yeah, you
are. >> Well, one. Cyber‑specific site. The thing is people in the government
sector, in the private and in the public sector use these terms. If we are going to get
along, communicate and work with each other, we have to agree on a set of verbiage. It seems like
if we want to communicate with them ‑‑ in the talk I am going to use device this is your car
that can control things in your car. Here is an example of a thing in your car ‑‑ >> Yeah.
Now we are going to go through ‑‑ very 250. Sweet car has all of these awesome
features. >> These cars have. Not many of us realize they have (noises/beeps). >> As you see, I
am on a closed test track in Pittsburgh. I am not ‑‑ >> I thought that was a Hollywood
testing. >> You can have controls that you don't to press from our experience like that,
send messages, sensor, compute values, sends messages, brakes work ‑‑ don't work ‑‑ >> A
sensor hooked up to the brakes. The brakes engage. The computer knows what the sensor values are
and communicates to the brakes. How to do that. When to do that. That means if you are on it, you
can be ‑‑ >> Exactly. (audio lost for captioner. >> It means that it has tock network
accessible to the head lamps. You sort of reduce the complexity of the network you
can have. Because you can't isolate those things you think would be isolated. It may have a
gateway in between but still . . . intelligent cruise control (noise behind a voice saying
something once it sees the back of the vehicle then the car speeds back up again. >> The car
pulls it ‑‑ slows itself down, speeds itself up. Can happen in communication, sensors, wires.
Sending mess as to the car, telling it to accelerate. That might be something we can take
advantage of (background noise with a voice. Saying actively stand back (inaudible). >>
Describe it as Andy Capping [phonetic] itself. >> You dated yourself. >> I did. There is one
old guy in the back nodding. >> But, yeah, steering. It will be a peace that is network
accessible. These are useful pieces; they keep drivers more safe. >> There is a computer
that can control the computer while you are driving. (background noise.) >> It is all
of compared to this didn't have sounds. You guys are getting bonuses. >> Bonus. >> Collision
prevention I am not going to touch brake. Hear the beeping? >> The brake, automatically, in
that instance ‑‑ I guess the radar knew it was cardboarded, not a public transit vehicle.
It's the same shot. >> No, different angle. This is why our hacking is (car sound in
background) imagine what they thought about this psychopath? Drive it through 'em? Anyway it
was a lot of fun. Way more fun ‑‑ >> Testing is better than connecting to the bug. >>
Actually wanted to really crash, thought it was going to stop one of the boxes smashed underneath
my car. >> Then. (Multiple voices). >> A lot of the coverage was really on the
network architecture view. We wanted to look at these three separate piece toss a remote
attack and look at cars and decide if we were to get one, which would we get which would
be most successful. We used the term "hack ability" we used that because it is less difficult
than explaining it every time as well. >> We can'ted a car that would present the least possible
problems to a remote attacker. >> Exactly. Our thought was you can buy a consumer reports
magazine it will tell you the cars with best safety features and ratings. I think we should
start doing it for cyber security of vehicles. We want to know what kind of security we
think these things have when we buy them, so you can be an informed consumer. My paper, if
you really want to read it, there is a lot of good stuff in there. >> We have presented so
far about ten pages. We will do the rest in the next four minutes. >> Getting the
information was hard a. Every manufacturer is different. Go to the mechanic's site. The wiring
diagrams are different. We try to correlate everything. It took a long time. >> The reason we
get the diagrams, go to the mechanics' sites, the first time, we downloading ‑‑ didn't
try to hack it. No instructions on how it is done. The sec time we looked at the wiring
diagrams. >> And decided we should have used them long ago. Hackers don't want to read
instructions. You buy a new table and for the next ten days figure out how it is assembled.
>> Hackers. Read the instructions. Didn't actually do the hack. >> The Internet is
hard. Let's go shopping. A lot of the websites ‑‑ >> Let's do it now. The websites just
weren't very useful. >> The forums. >> I am trying to be nice. >> You search things like
cam. Nothing. I know you have a cam bus. I have used it. If you are not logged in, you don't get
search results. If you are, you get different once. This constantly only works Tuesdays
and Wednesdays and bank holidays. >> Looks like they are working perfectly. Suck. Load up
IE 6. Don't tell you to use a different browser. I can't find this. Dude, IE 7. You have to
look at it. I am sure all of the computers ‑‑ to hell and back be. >> Huge collaboration
between the NFA and automotive manufacturers. >> Exactly. >> It took time. I don't want to
say ‑‑ this is the boring part, remote survey. We tried to make it easy. If you get the paper
you will get these icons. These things are kind of important pieces, the pieces bee he want
to research and are concerned with. All of the ‑‑ cyber physical things. Put them on the
diagram. We are going to fly through the diagrams. There is not much to say. You want to
read the paper, look at them. Note there is a bunch of different arc about tech tours.
I thought most of the cars would be ‑‑ had all of the Internet stuff somewhere then the
important other stuff somewhere, other stuff other places, connected by a gateway. That is
how they are set up. Obviously, this is not the case. You have a new Accord, for example, or
audionav unit connected to both cam buses. Things like that are problematic for us. If you hack
bluetooth you are on a device not only on your power train bus but on your secondary cam bus as
well. >> The last two cars is way easy, presents less obstacles. In the three steps
there is no step two. >> Remote, figure out how to make the brakes. >> Exactly. You have
almost everything on one cam bongs gateway that communicates with braking and steering.
Having stuff on one bus especially that contains the wireless connectivity features
is something that we probably think can be used to easily achieve hacking into the car. >>
Because there happens to be a gatewar between the radio and brakes does not mean you can't
send messages it will make it harder. The academics were able to go from a part of the car's
network to wherever the brakes and stuff were by reprogramming the gateway. It is possible you
can get by the gateways. >> They are not stopping everything. We have to look at it. >> Something
else you have to look like. In the Escape there are two networks, one where the P PMS
and the brakes [phonetic]. On not sure how to get from the PPMS to the brakes. Hard to
tell. Cars went through evolution. Here is a 2010 and 2006. Each car taking the place
of the other. Went from the flat pan networks to a more segmented one they added more features and
functionality. People say I am going to go buy that. >> I buy the new car. Has all of the
safety features of those things are going to safe your ass more than be . . . >> That thing
stops itself. I can drive and tweet all the time. All day. >> Why wouldn't you. >> Drive and
tweet. Get a latte. Don't know if we have time to do this. This carry ended up getting most
hackable. There are two different cam buses, all a of the interesting things are
there. But there is the radio which has almost all of the wireless stuff. I lives on both
of those networks. Essentially it does not look like a flat network. But it is completely
flat. Everything you care about. While the Dodge is the same way it does not have cyber specific
things even though the network architecture is the same. The car is made by the same parent
company but network line is different. The big difference is the radio is only on the
privileged network not the one that has the brakes. Even though you think they are both the same
parent company they would be the exactly the same douse not end up the same. It is the same as
300, less cyber specific features. Goes fast. >> I wanted that to be the most hackable to
justify buying it. >> SC [phonetic] segmented cam but interesting stuff connected to
both. Old Ford Fusion not much in it. New one, a lot in it. These things go through an
evolution. BMW as well. >> The cars most applicable have the most features. >> That does not
mean that we want cars with less features. We want cars with all sorts of radical features. But
design ‑‑ exactly. You can see BMW similar throughout. Most cars except the concept car is
crazy. >> Even that is segmented. >> Yes. Range Rover very segmented. Has not changed
all that much in the evolution of their vehicles where you just have ‑‑ ended up using
technology, still enjoy it, have suppliers that use it. It happens a lot. Sometimes they
don't change at all a. 2014 Prius basically identical to the 2010. At one point you had this
massive shift in architecture. Again more features more complexity. They re‑architect
how these things are done. We have been told to eliminate all of our chatter ‑‑ >> Right. What
about . . . range Rovers. >> Bentleys. All of the cars we did not look at. More completion.
Manufacturers have different designs for different cars. We have been saying for almost two
years: Almost every car had something different about it. >> Right. >> This is the thing that
made hacking a car hard. Even if you know everything about a car it does not generalize to other
cars. Which is why we do this talk. Last year, we knew something about two cars. We
know a Lot little about all of the cars but not much about all of them. >> Holy shit, patching
is a huge disaster is one of the things we found. Get patch or update, it is easy, almost
automatic. Right now you with a problem in the car they send you a letter, tell you to go to a
mechanic shop to get the car fixed. What happens when you sell the car? Right now there is
this huge issue with patching. If something comes out, there is no good way to fix it. >> When I
get a recall notice ‑‑ I rip it up. >> I still get recall notices for the Prius and Ford
escape. >> That is cars are fine. >> Those cars are fine. They are dead. Securing an
automobile is important to us. End points. People are doing right now. Maybe you could
segment cam message injection. The thing with the bluetooth does that have to write messages
on the bus? Probably not. I am not an automotive architect. But, you know ‑‑ >> We can tell
manufacturers to focus on stopping the remote attacks. That is one of the three steps.
We want to make all three steps ‑‑ >> Live and learn. It is kind of turning back a clock.
The same a steps we went through in the late '90's and early ops same things happen in cars.
Crypto not going to work. >> Feel sorry the people who are working. They are going to start
crying if they don't see this. >> From our perspective, adds a layer of complexity for hackers.
What didn't we talk about? That is used almost ridiculously in everyone's environment is
prevention. This is the hackolator 3000. We came up with these algorithms. >> You did. >>
I architected it. >> You were there. >> I was present. So that's something. Basically,
press a button, learn how the car works. If anything is ‑‑ stadard movement. We saw how
attacks work. No way to objfuscate them. The networks are simple. Then stop the
attack. We have in thing here. >> Car networks are different from Internet. The main thing.
Network is completely predictable on computers. Things like attacks stand out. Go!
(Multiple voices). >> (background noise) brakes stop. Now I am going to turn on . . .
I would say something is wrong. Safe from attack. Safely drive the vehicle. >> This only took a
few seconds to learn how a car works. If there is an attack disabling the brakes, you can
stop it before it is happening. We often short the cam bus out. Nothing would work but I am sure
you can do something else. >> Like anything is anomalous, all of the attacks we know ‑‑ >> You
can plug this into any car. As long as you can get a nice sample ‑‑ >> That is it. Thanks.
Wait. There is one more thing. Oh, I fooled ya. >> Suckers! >> So we are going to have some
bugs dropped now. Two method os to ‑‑ jeep, dodge SRT. >> That is a model skateboard. >> Here
is how you can jail‑break your car. The way that updates work is ‑‑ for these vehicles is get
a USB stick, download iso valve [phonetic] the car. (Off microphone) It checks it against
the encryptor path if that is cool it updates your file. So I had an idea: I will wait until
it checks for ‑‑ runs through and verifies. Then I will switch out the USB switch see if that
works. It is cool, says it installed it. Ungh. Did not work. The stick. Says it is
not ‑‑ you are not going to change up on me. They thought about it. Well done, Chrysler.
They didn't think about this I go further. Say yes, I would like to install this software.
(noise in background. The noise you are camping. >> That is the Bronx. >> As soon as it
restarts, I pull the stick, now the car is in a bit of a pickle. It has written values. Doesn't
start in upgrade mode what it is going to do now instead of fully rejecting me, in a moment it is
going to beg me for ‑‑ >> You are going to put the same one that was in there? >> No ‑‑ fair
enough ‑‑ I am going to stick the stick in there. Now it is going to check. The code that
does the check is from the USB stick. I am going to leave off that part. >> Can you
fast‑forward here a bit. It says insert your stick. >> So bad. >> Anyway, you can fast‑forward to
the end ‑‑ you will see that ‑‑ never mind. You ruined it. Jail break method two, the preferred
method for hackers. Take the upgrade file, reverse it. There are some ‑‑ in there. In charm
of the check. There is an awesome code snippet there. It opens the file, reads 128 bites
into the file, reads one byte. If it is a capital F ‑‑ be if it is ‑‑ awesome data. Skip. I am
going to reverse‑engineer. Yeah. >> I think most people can do that ‑‑ >> I found it! Found it.
Entered capital a letter F and although and behold it totally works. Then I can do things ‑‑
it already has SSH on it. Put that on, enter my password. >> What would you do? Also.
(Applause) >> If I had my car, I would do this what would you all do? >> When you start your car .
. . (sound of car starting). >> Thanks a lot. (Applause)