Evil DoS Attacks and Strong Defenses

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DEF CON 21

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Bio


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Bio


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Evil Attacks

Sockstress
New IPv6 RA Flood

Sockstress

TCP Handshake



Client



Server

Images from drawingstep.com and us.123rf.com

TCP Window Size



TCP Header Format

Sockstress Attack



Client

Server

Images from drawingstep.com and us.123rf.com

From 2008

- Still not patched
- Attacks TCP by sending a small WINDOW size
- Causes sessions to hang up, consuming RAM
- Can render servers **unbootable**

Sockstress Demo




Attack Stopped
Windows Task Manager
File Options View Help
Applications Processes Services Performance Networking Users
CPU Usage
1 %
CPU Usage History
Memory
1.77 GB
Physical Memory Usage History
Physical Memory (MB)
Total 2047
Cached 111
Available 230
Free 121
Kernel Memory (MB)
Paged 111
Nonpaged 973
System
Handles 291279
Threads 536
Processes 50
Up Time 0:00:17:04
Commit (MB) 1819 / 4094
Resource Monitor...
Processes: 50
CPU Usage: 1%
Physical Memory: 88%

Mitigation

- Short-term
  - Block packets with small window sizes with a firewall
- Long-term
  - PATCH OS to reclaim RAM
  - It's been 5 years, guys!

IPv4 Exhaustion

IPv4 Exhaustion



One Year Left

www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/

IANA Unallocated Address Pool Exhaustion:
03-Feb-2011

Projected RIR Address Pool Exhaustion Dates:

RIR	Projected Exhaustion Date	Remaining Addresses in RIR Pool (/8s)
APNIC:	**19-Apr-2011** (actual)	0.8694
RIPE NCC:	**14-Sep-2012** (actual)	0.9050
ARIN:	**15-Apr-2014**	2.3773
LACNIC:	**28-Aug-2014**	2.5294
AFRINIC:	**01-Aug-2020**	3.7308

IPv6 Exhaustion



Link-Local DoS

IPv6 Router Advertisements

Old Attack (from 2011)

Image from forumlane.org

IPv4: DHCP

PULL process

- Client requests an IP
- Router provides one



IPv6: Router Advertisements

PUSH process

- Router announces its presence
- Every client on the LAN creates an address and joins the network



Router Advertisement Packet



RA Flood (from 2011)
flood_router6



Effects of flood_router6

- Drives Windows to 100% CPU
- Also affects FreeBSD
- No effect on Mac OS X or Ubuntu Linux

The New RA Flood

Image from guntech.com/

MORE IS BETTER

- Each RA now contains
  - 17 Route Information sections
  - 18 Prefix Information sections


Frame 116: 1038 bytes on wire (8304 bits), 1038 bytes captured (8304 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: Apple_f6:27:8a (44:2a:60:f6:27:8a), Dst: IPv6mcast_00:00:00:01 (33:33:00:00:00:01)
Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: fe80::94:3b5e:94b4:7b01 (fe80::94:3b5e:94b4:7b01), Dst: ff02::1 (ff02::1)
Internet Control Message Protocol v6
Type: Router Advertisement (134)
Code: 0
Checksum: 0x2b0c [correct]
Cur hop limit: 255
Flags: 0x08
Router lifetime (s): 65535
Reachable time (ms): 16384000
Retrans timer (ms): 1966080
ICMPv6 Option (MTU : 1500)
ICMPv6 Option (Source link-layer address : 44:2a:60:f6:27:8a)
ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:943c:5f94:b47b::/64)
ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:943d:6194:b47b::/64)
ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:943e:6394:b47b::/64)
ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:943f:6594:b47b::/64)
ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9440:6794:b47b::/64)
ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9441:6994:b47b::/64)
ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9442:6b94:b47b::/64)
ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9443:6d94:b47b::/64)
ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9444:6f94:b47b::/64)
ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9445:7194:b47b::/64)
ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9446:7394:b47b::/64)

Flood Does Not Work Alone

- Before the flood, you must send some normal RA packets
- This puts Windows into a vulnerable state
  - Thanks to var_x for noticing this in my lab at CCSF

How to Perform this Attack

- For best results, use a gigabit Ethernet NIC on attacker and a gigabit switch
- Use thc-ipv6 2.1 on Linux
- Three Terminal windows:
  1. ./fake_router6 eth1 a::/64
  2. ./fake_router6 eth1 b::/64
  3. ./flood_router26 eth1
- Windows dies within 30 seconds

Effects of New RA Flood

- Win 8 & Server 2012 die (BSOD)
- Microsoft Surface RT dies (BSOD)
- Mac OS X dies
- Win 7 & Server 2008 R2, with the "IPv6 Readiness Update" freeze during attack
- iPad 3 slows and sometimes crashes
- Android phone slows and sometimes crashes
- Ubuntu Linux suffers no harm

Videos and Details



Mitigation

- Disable IPv6
- Turn off Router Discovery with netsh
- Use a firewall to block rogue RAs
- Get a switch with RA Guard
- Microsoft's "IPv6 Readiness Update" provides some protection for Win 7 & Server 2008 R2
  - Released Nov. 13, 2012
  - KB 2750841
  - ***But NOT for Win 8 or Server 2012!!***

DEMO

More Info

- Slides, instructions for the attacks, & more at
- Samsclass.info